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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LL.M. in Transnational and European 
Commercial Law, Banking Law, Arbitration/Mediation at the International Hellenic 
University. 
In today’s global financial reality, countries try to attract foreign direct investment 
(FDI) in order to achieve economic development and growth. This dissertation 
examines the special category of tax incentives as means for the attraction of FDI as 
one of the most popular incentives at international level. Then, it makes a brief 
analysis regarding strategic investments in Greece and its general investment climate 
and legal framework.  Tax incentives concerning FDI create measurable risks and have 
been proved in many cases improper and dangerous .This is why, the paper concludes 
in the thesis that countries should avoid the enforcement of special tax incentives for 
the attraction of FDI and focus on policies and actions aiming at the improvement of 
the general financial and investment climate that characterizes it. 
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Introduction 
Today’s global financial reality is completely different than the one years ago. 
Countries, individual investors and legal entities must confront a new, constantly 
evolving and more challenging economic era. This era defined by the new commercial 
reality, consists of the emerge of global markets, transnational trade and free flow of 
capital, goods, services and workforce (Hanson, 2001). Whoever cannot keep up with 
the evolution and change of international economy cannot survive. Old-fashion 
assumptions about how the world works will lead with certainty to failure (Gergely, 
2003). World has passed the period when markets and general economy were strictly 
closed and controlled by the governments. In our days, international financial 
institutions like the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), 
shape policies and promote global principles, ethics and solutions for open 
international markets and global business fields (OECD Official Website, 2020).  While 
some years ago it was countries and their policymakers who decided and formed the 
financial climate, now it is the financial sector itself who leads the road, evolves and 
controls as wells as determines the limits of politics (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006).  
The current state of the global economy seems ideal for multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) that have the resources to diversify their countries of operations and expand 
their target markets (Blonigen, 2005; Levitt, 1993). These multinational companies 
seek for new capital opportunities across the world which will empower their global 
competitive status (Gergely, 2003). What each enterprise looks for in a country is 
different and it depends on its goals, business operations and strategic plan. What is 
more, the desirable advantages appear to differentiate based on the era (Gergely, 
2003). For example, a multinational company operating in the field of agriculture 50 
years ago would primarily seek for available and fertile foreign land (Lent, 1967). On 
the other hand, a MNE in the banking sector today would probably examine the 
available opportunities in a country with economic growth, sufficient liquidity, etc.  
However, according to empirical studies, there are two common determinants that 
affect FDI inflows in a country (Blonigen, 2005). These are the market size of the host 
country and its infrastructure (Blonigen, 2005). Generally, many theories about the 
basic determinants enterprises examine in order to invest abroad have been 
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developed (Blonigen, 2005). One of the most well-known is the eclectic approach, 
developed by John Dunning (1977, 1988). According to Dunning (1997, 1988), 
ownership, location and internalization are the three factors that an enterprise may 
take under consideration in order to examine whether a foreign investment is 
beneficial or not (the OLI paradigm). He also categorized FDI depending on the motives 
into market-seeking, resource-seeking and efficiency seeking FDI (Dunning, 1993). On 
the other hand, the World Investment Report of 1998, UNCTAD (1998) categorized FDI 
determinants in politic factors, business facilitation and economic factors.  
As Agiomirgianakis et al. (2003) noted, FDI can be defined as the financial outcome 
(cash inflows) from a foreign company’s (usually a multinational company) operations 
in the host country. Thus, the factors that affect the behavior of MNCs may also affect 
the magnitude and the direction of FDI. Countries, on their side, try to pull MNEs into 
their territory to take advantage of the capital inflows, new job opportunities and 
several other benefits these new established investments can bring (Zee et al., 2002). 
Thus, the term policy competition which refers to the most efficient and effective 
attraction of FDI is more topical than ever. This approach has influenced modern 
governments and formed new trends and policies according to foreign investment and 
the treatment they should have by the host state (Hanson, 2001). According to the G-
24 discussion paper series 2001, developing countries, during the last twenty years, 
have become drastically more open and friendly to foreign investment by improving 
the investment and financial climate into their territory and by creating motives and 
opportunities of all kinds for foreign investors (Hanson, 2001).  Tax breaks, 
governmental subsidies, exceptions from import duties, international agreements etc. 
focus on boosting international competition and attract foreign capital (Klemm, 2010). 
Among all the types of incentives, tax ones seem to have gain the most attention both 
by policymakers and literature. Today, some of the countries with the most attractive 
FDI tax frameworks are China, Maldives and Malta (tax heaven) (Davies, 2012; Zebregs 
and Tseng, 2002). In fact, according to the World Investment report (2018), in 2017 
China remained the 2nd largest FDI recipient globally, right after USA (Davies, 2012).  As 
the tax regime of a country plays significant role for its financial stage, the adoption of 
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a special, most favorable tax treatment for foreign investments and its effects is a 
burning issue that remains unsolved (Klemm, 2010; Davies, 2012).  
When we refer to the foreign direct investment sector, Greece has been one of the 
weakest EU countries (Paneta, 2019). Constantly changing legal regimes, high 
corporate taxes and intense control and regulation of the labor and product markets 
are factors that have negatively affected FDI and general investment (Barkas and Pisu, 
2018). As it was expected, after the burst of the Global Economic Crisis Greece’s 
investment climate considerably declined (Lenakou, 2014). It was the period when the 
country implemented the “Memoranda”, trying to survive and restructure its economy 
in a more neoliberal way (Gardiakou, 2018). In 2010, the government committed for 
the adoption of a more favorable framework concerning FDI and investment in 
strategic sectors and implemented the Law 3894/2010 “Acceleration and Transparency 
regarding the Realization of Strategic Investments” (Gemenetzi et al., 2018). It was the 
first time the term strategic investment was introduced in the Greek Law 
characterizing investments of keen importance for financial development and gave 
several considerable incentives (Gemenetzi et al., 2018; Konstantinidis and Vlachou, 
2018). What is more, the above Law also resulted in the establishment of the 
institution “Invest In Greece S.A.”, now renamed to “Enterprise Greece”, for the 
promotion and attraction of strategic foreign and domestic investment. Today, post-
crisis Greece, following the international “trend” is constantly trying through 
legislation and other methods to attract foreign capital and investment in its territory 
giving extra focus to strategic investment (Gemenetzi et al., 2018). The most recent 
published law is the Law 4608/2019 for the attraction of strategic investment (Nomos 
Official Website, 2020). According to the website of Enterprise Greece that operates as 
an official agency of Greek State and the data from the Bank of Greece, 2018 inflows of 
FDI are increased compared to 2017 (a 9,0% raise) reaching the highest level of the last 
decade (Paneta, 2019). However, the numbers are still low and the discussion about 
the effectiveness of the legal framework and its provided incentives is controversial.  
As mentioned above, the reality is that countries, developed and developing, are 
competing in the international field in order to gain the most foreign investment and 
capital they can. However, their positive externalities are questionable as most 
8 
 
empirical studies can only indicate whether there is a positive correlation between 
them and FDI (Blonigen, 2005). For example, while the study findings indicate a 
positive correlation between FDI and national welfare, this can be interpreted in two 
conflicting ways (Blonigen, 2005). It ether means that increased FDI in the country is 
responsible for the raise of national welfare or that the high level of FDI in this 
particular country is subsequent to its notable national welfare (Blonigen, 2005).  
The most recent studies present mixed results regarding the connection between FDI 
and positive spillovers for the host country (Hanson, 2001; Simelyte, 2013). This 
controversy has turned literature’s interest to a very ambiguous but also triggering 
question (Hanson, 2001; Simelyte, 2013). Since FDI is not always a determinant factor 
for and host country’s financial and general growth, what about the special policies 
and incentives countries have adopted? The questions that come subsequently are the 
below: 
1.  Can we take as granted that foreign Direct Investment is beneficial for the host 
country’s economy and general growth? 
2. Are special FDI incentives and more specifically tax incentives the appropriate 
means for the attraction of foreign direct investment, and even if the answer is yes, 
3. Are they capable of interfering in the country’s economic stability?  
In this study, we are going to examine tax incentives as means for the attraction of FDI 
and make an effort to answer the questions above. To continue with, we are going to 
make a general reference to the Greek legal framework concerning the attraction and 
increase of both FDI and domestic investment, as long as they have been characterized 
as strategic. Questions about their adequacy and efficiency are going to be discussed 
always in relation to their influence in the country’s financial development and 
investment climate.  
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FDI and Incentives 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a form of investment where an investor (firm or 
individual) invests capital in a foreign country (Jirasavetakul and Rahman, 2018). In 
other words, foreign direct investment consists of an investment party that decides to 
expand its or set up a new form of business in a foreign country. This can generally be 
done by acquisitions, joint ventures in the host country and/or the establishment of a 
wholly owned subsidiary and/or affiliate (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006; Simelyte, 2013). 
The main characteristics of an FDI are the duration of the investment (it should be long 
term), the level of control the investor has and, last but not least, the profitability 
(Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006; Simelyte, 2013). In the era of globalization and liberalization 
of the market there is a new reality where multinational businesses try to thrive and 
grow (Levitt, 1993). FDI, thus, has a keen importance as it allows businesses/investors 
to operate in an international environment, have access to multiple and more diverse 
resources and, therefore, increase their competitiveness in the global market 
(Jirasavetakul and Rahman, 2018; Jensen and Malesky, 2010). Moreover, FDI is 
considered of keen importance for the countries (both home and host) as it stimulates 
financial, social, technological and general development (Hanson, 2001). The capital 
inflows, the adoption and development of new technologies and know-hows along 
with the increased job opportunities are some of the advantages that FDI can bring to 
the host county (Hanson, 2001). Regarding the home country FDI can be proved 
beneficial in financial (repatriation) and diplomatic ways (Kolotouras, 2014; Hanson, 
2001).  
Despite its positive aspect, FDI is considered a relatively ambiguous subject that has 
drawn the attention of scholars as well as politicians (Ginevicius and Simelyte, 2011). 
Do the local businesses have access to the same incentives as the foreign investors? Is 
the competition fair? Furthermore, sometimes governments are willing to sacrifice 
fundamental labour and environmental rights to benefit from a strategic FDI project. 
An extreme example is the “creation” of sweatshops which although beneficial for 
finance metrics, they are both unethical and usually dangerous for the employees 
(Klemm, 2010). It has been observed that, while in the beginning of FDI development 
most opinions and researches were focused only to the advantages and positive 
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outcomes that FDI can result to, contemporary literature focuses on the opposite point 
of view and, in many cases, emphasizes the possible risks and negative effects (Lim, 
1983).  One of the major arguments has to do with the degree of competitiveness local 
investors can demonstrate (Ginevicius and Simelyte, 2011); can the local investors 
compete with the multinational firms? What does the establishment of a big 
multinational company mean for the local small and medium enterprises (SMEs)? Do 
domestic SMEs have enough resources? Many times, host countries tend to ignore and 
wrongly evaluate the financial situation as well as the country’s needs for FDI (Klemm, 
2010). In this stage, it is important to note that except for the prevailing view that 
more FDI implies better economy, very often politicians’ decisions to boost FDI result 
from personal ambitions and potential personal benefits (Klemm, 2010). For example, 
the cooperation between a multibillion MNC and a politician for its establishment and 
special treatment in the host country may have as main purpose the future support of 
the politician in its carrier or even financial reward (Cleeve, 2008; Klemm, 2010). 
According to the World Investment Report 2019 by UNCTAD, 2018 was the third year 
in the row we observed international foreign direct investment flows decline by 13% to 
$1.3 trillion (Zones, 2019). On the other hand, from the Countries’ side, it is observed a 
constant effort to attract foreign investment by adopting new policies and changing 
their regulatory framework with more FDI directed regimes (Ginevicius and Simelyte, 
2011). The World Investment Report (2017) noted that in 2018, approximately 55 
countries and economies implemented at least 112 policy measures to attract foreign 
investment. Liberalization measures are very popular among countries as are 
privatizations and amendments to some administrative procedures (Demirhan and 
Masca, 2008). When we refer to the term incentives, we consider every means that 
deviates from general legal and regulatory framework and gives measurable 
advantages to enterprises and encourages them to act in a certain way (Rolfe et al., 
1993). FDI incentives can be distinguished in the following forms. 
- Fiscal incentives: They constitute aspects of the fiscal policy of a country. They 
mainly target to the reduction of tax burden on the taxpayer enterprise in 
multiple ways (Cleeve, 2008). Fiscal incentives are usually offered in the form of 
tax reliefs and can be categorized in discriminatory and non-discriminatory 
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(Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Klemm, 2010). The term discriminatory refers to 
foreign investors being the only beneficiaries while non- discriminatory 
incentives address to all investors (Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Klemm 2010).  
 
- Financial incentives: They consist of direct economic benefits provided by the 
governments. They have the form of funds for new investments or relief of 
capital and/or operation expenditures (Clark, 2000). To be more specific 
governments provide preferential rates (insurance and loans) direct grants and 
subsidized credit. A country that has given considerable governmental 
subsidies is Brazil (Hanson, 2001). For instance, Brazil offered to Honda 
generous subsidies that appeared to be the basic determinant for Honda’s 
decision to establish a motorcycle plant in the Amazon area (Hanson, 2001). 
 
- Regulatory incentives: They usually have the form of special legal regimes 
which provide for more simple and immediate admission and establishment 
procedures (Clark, 2000).  
 
- Other forms of investment incentives constitute the Investment Promotion 
Agencies, (IPAs) preferential treatment over local enterprises and certain 
subsidized services (Clark, 2000). 
Countries in their effort to attract FDI use incentives of all the above categories. 
However, the choice of each incentive depends on the different stages in their social 
and economic evolution and gives priority to different measures and policies that fit 
better in their realities (Demirhan and Masca, 2008). For example, developed countries  
with stable economies and healthy market competition behaviors, which have  already 
managed to attract FDI in their territory, choose to make more use of financial and 
promotional measures and guarantee for liberalized conditions for admission, 
establishment and security standards, rather than implementing  special 
discriminatory FDI incentives, either fiscal or other (Klemm, 2010) . On the other hand, 
developing countries in order to balance out economic instability and reduced growth, 
aim to show to potential investors that they are willing to offer exclusive advantages 
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that they will not be able to find anywhere else (Zee et al., 2002). Special tax treatment 
of dividends and incentives for reinvested earnings are only a few of this kind of 
“offers” developing countries provide (Zee et al., 2002). Measures like the above may 
also be seen as a statement of commitment on behalf of the country for its upcoming 
evolution and prosperity. Moreover, States choose to sign international investment 
treaties to avoid impediments like double taxation and enterprise agreements which 
require the adoption of a law, stating the state’ s and investors’ rights and obligations 
(Zones, 2019). In 2018 it is reported that 40 new International Investment Agreements 
(IIAs) were signed (Zones, 2019).  
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Tax incentives 
Among fiscal, financial and other types of incentives, it appears that the first ones are 
mostly preferred by countries as means to attract foreign direct investment (Klemm 
and Van Parys, 2012). More specifically, for the period after 2001, about 95% of the 
measures developed countries have used for FDI had mostly tax character (for 
example Belgium and Canada) as, according to James (2009), an 1% in the tax rate can 
decrease Foreign Direct Investment about 3,3%. James (2009) defined these incentives 
as interventions to the taxation of the capitals and/or the taxation of the income from 
FDI projects.  Moreover, tax incentives have become a “trend” in developing and in 
transition countries especially after the example of China, as the scarcity of capital 
leads to the research for external resources (Klemm, 2010; Zebregs and Tseng, 2002; 
Davies, 2012). The implementation of tax incentives can be justified by many 
theoretical factors. One of them is tax competition among countries. According to this 
school of thought, countries, in order to preserve and boost their competitive status in 
the modern globalized economy, shape their tax policy in an appropriate way to 
attract capital and taxable profits (Zee et al., 2002). Therefore, tax incentives are 
usually considered as a tool of tax competition (Morisset and Pirnia, 1999). A different 
factor may be that enacting tax incentives is usually easier and quicker for 
governments than the research and the subsequent process of resolving a country’s 
fundamental problems that discourage FDI (Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). What is 
more, the alternative of implementing governmental funds and subsidies is usually 
judged and scrutinized stricter than the adoption of a tax incentive. Fiscal (tax) 
incentives adopted by governments serve specific and very distinct purposes (Klemm, 
2010). In many cases they are implemented in order to boost development in certain 
regions or to promote and strengthen weak business sectors or even to maintain the 
established FDI in the territory. What is more, countries, like China and Ireland, have 
adopted special tax incentives in order to attract R&D companies or operation because 
they are considered very promising and beneficial in many fields (Tan, 2002; Davies, 
2012). However, until today, it is observed a strong skepticism by economists about 
the use of such incentives even though they constitute popular means among policy 
makers. What is more, especially for developing and in transition countries, there is 
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not any sufficient evidence nor empirical studies proving the pivotal importance of tax 
incentives as means for the attraction of FDI (Holland and Vann, 1998). 
Tax incentives, as part of the fiscal policy of a country, are subject to the country’s 
sovereignty which can also implement whatever measure considers appropriate, 
without external interventions, globalization, open borders and empirical experience 
(Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Holland and Vann, 1998; Levitt, 1993). Thus, they have 
led to common practices and policies among states, and to the formation of some 
“typical categories “of tax incentives that countries use to attract foreign investment. 
As logical as it is, although these categories and each incentive may be modified 
depending on the legal order it is implemented into, and the general legal principles 
followed by the state, their core characteristics are the same. Thus, we can categorize 
typical tax incentives that states use in the following categories: 
 
Tax Holidays: This incentive introduces specific tax free periods. Usually they 
exempt new foreign investments from corporate income tax for a certain 
period of time and by doing so they increase an investor’s profit margin (De 
Mooij and Ederveen, 2003). Tax holidays aim to lighten some burden from new 
business enterprises that face high costs due to the foundation of the business 
itself. By definition, this measure is more attractive to businesses that expect to 
make early profits as they will be more benefited by the tax exemption than 
enterprises expected to gain profit in the long term as the tax exemption may 
have passed. On the other hand, tax holidays could be abusively used by these 
early-earn profit enterprises which may get benefited by the incentive and then 
stop operating after the incentive expires (Morisset and Pirnia, 1999). What is 
more, the exemption of income tax can lead to a less strict control of the 
business’ income/expenses and there are cases where investors try to 
manipulate tax holidays system and extend its duration by following practices 
like rent seeking (Tollison, 2004). With the term rent seeking we mean a 
business’ effort to increase gains and income from government policies 
manipulation, instead of creating wealth (Tollison, 2004). Another abusive 
practice of tax holidays is when not qualified tax enterprises come into deals 
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with enterprises that enjoy tax exemption to shift their profits through transfer 
pricing (Zee et al., 2002). These dangers in combination with real life 
experience have been criticized intensively by literature which discourages 
countries from the adoption of tax holidays, especially when there are high 
levels of corruption in the host country (Reiter and Steemsma, 2010). However, 
they still constitute a very popular incentive especially among developing 
countries and countries in transition (Beyer, 2002). According to the World 
Investment Competitiveness Report 2017/2018 by World Bank Organization 
and a database that was created for the purposes of that report, providing 
information on 107 countries for the period 2019-2015, in more than 50% of 
the developing countries, tax holidays have been offered as FDI incentive in at 
least one economic sector (Schwab, 2018). 
 
Special Zones: In its most simple form, this measure concerns geographically 
limited areas where states provide fiscal incentives (tax exemptions or/and 
reductions) to investments established therein (De Mooij and Ederveen, 2003).  
Special economic zones may provide for more than tax incentives as for 
example exemptions from import or export duties, administration facilities and 
employees training programs.  They constitute an effective tool for the 
economic and technological boost that some regions could not achieve 
otherwise. A particular case that raises concern is when the special zones for 
international trading companies, provide exceptions from direct and/or indirect 
taxes even if the company sells part of its output nationally (Easson, 2004). In 
many cases, this policy can lead to significant revenue costs. However, just like 
tax holidays, special economic zones (SEZs) are a widely used incentive. Today, 
more than 140 economies worldwide use SEZs both developed and developing 
(UNCTAD, 2019). However, it is observed that while in developed economies, 
special zones are mostly implemented as customs-free zones in order to 
provide tariff reliefs, in developing countries, they are usually used as means 
more the attraction of FDI and economic development (IMF, 2018). US, India 
and the Philippines are the countries with the highest use of SEZs (IMF, 2018). 
Nowadays, many “types” of special economic zones (SEZs) have emerged 
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because as we mentioned above, it is a widely implemented measure by both 
developed and developing economies. 
 
Investment Allowance: It is a measure directed to tax free recovery from 
investment costs as it reduces income tax liabilities. Like investment tax credits 
(see below), it allows the deduction of a fixed percentage of an investment at 
the time an asset is purchased. This deduction concerns only the investment’s 
taxable profit (Easson, 2004). There is a strong opinion in literature that 
investment allowances can better serve their purpose than tax holidays as they 
are more effective in promoting the investments wanted, and their revenue 
costs for the economy are easier to predict and measure (Porcano and Price, 
1996). On the other hand, the specific incentive has been perceived as a cause 
for the distortion of the choice of capital, as new investors in order to benefit 
from multiple allowances may turn towards fast-replaced goods. 
 
Investment Tax Credits: It is a tax measure that allows investments to deduct a 
certain percentage of investment related costs from their tax liability (De Mooij 
and Ederveen, 2003). The deduction is provided at the time of the purchase of 
the asset and it does not affect any depreciation allowances (Porcano and 
Price, 1996).  Tax credits, similarly to investment allowances and accelerate 
depreciation, as incentives that target at capital investments can cause revenue 
costs which depend on the amount of capital the business decides to invest.  
 
Accelerated Depreciation: It is an additional depreciation deduction at a faster 
schedule than the general rule indicates for the taxpayers. Accelerated 
depreciation can take many forms. It may be provided as an increased 
depreciation rate or investments may have higher depreciation standards for 
the first years of their operation (initial depreciation) (Klemm, 2010). In 
comparison with the other forms of incentives, it is meritorious that by only 
offering a faster depreciation without increasing the total allowable nominal 
depreciation of the asset, this incentive neither distort the regular tax 
allocation nor causes big distortions when compared to other incentives 
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(Holland, D., & Vann, R. J., 1998). Therefore, this incentive seems idea for 
investments that heavily rely on initial costs that can be depreciated (i.e. 
vehicles, machinery etc.). 
 
Reduced Tax Rates: The reduction usually concerns the corporate income tax 
rate and it may be temporary or permanent (James, S., 2009). It may also 
concern only income earned from specific kinds of activities or non-resident 
investors’ income (James, S., 2009). When reduced tax rates apply, it is of great 
importance the existence of specific criteria that make the identification of the 
benefited sectors easy and objective. In this way, transparency prevails and 
incidents like discretion on behalf of the authorities can be avoided.  This 
measure targets at promoting FDI, and also at eliminating repatriation 
strategies and strengthening host country’s tax revenue base. Again this is a 
measure that may cause uneven competition with the local investors who, by 
definition, will face higher costs.  
 
Exemptions From Various Taxes. States desire to create all the positive 
preconditions for a new foreign investment and financially facilitate it by 
exempt it from taxes like tariffs (Klemm, 2010). However, the discriminatory 
exemption can lead to misallocation of capital and favor qualified enterprises 
that may be proved unsustainable and not beneficial in the long run.   
 
Financing Tax Incentives: They aim at reducing the cost of raising investment 
funds so, most of the times they apply to shareholders (Clark, 2000).  
 
Tax Stabilization: It is a measure that actually freezes the tax regime as it is at 
the time of the approval and/or establishment of a new business for a long 
period of time (Lent, 1967). Tax stabilization for a foreign investment means 
that it is not affected by any modification tax law is going to be subjected in the 
future including adjustments in tax assessment and collection as well as 
modification of tax rates and new taxes enforcement (Lent, 1967).   
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Tax Sparing: In the OECD report, Tax Sparing: A reconsideration, of 1998, the 
following general characteristic is used on page 11: “In the case of a credit 
country, tax sparing provisions basically enable the investor to obtain a foreign 
tax credit for the taxes that have been “spared” (i.e. not actually paid) under 
the incentive regime of the source country.” (OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs, 
1998). Tax sparing is a common tax treaty provision between developed and 
developing countries which enables foreign investors otherwise subject to 
double taxation, to benefit from tax incentives host country provides and at the 
same time be exempted from residence taxation as if they did not benefit from 
the incentives (Nilsen, 2013). 
 
The implementation of any form of tax incentives to the general tax regime creates 
extra responsibilities to tax administrators who must ensure among other things that 
the incentive is applied according to the Law and that the beneficiary investment is 
appropriately qualified. The right fulfillment of these tasks in combination with factors 
such as the following policies of a country and the specific effects and adequacy of the 
incentive are measurable factors that are taken under consideration when we examine 
the effectiveness of tax incentives. How effective FDI tax incentives are? 
Before answering this question, it is important to determine the term effectiveness for 
the purposes of our analysis. To begin, we are going to examine effectiveness from 
several points of view. First, we will examine effectiveness on the scope of the impact 
of FDI tax incentives regarding to the inflows of foreign investments referring to some 
indicative researches and empirical studies. Next, we will attempt to examine 
effectiveness of tax incentives through determinants like legal certainty, transparency, 
cost-effectiveness etc. (Blonigen, 2005).  
1. According to Klemm and Van Parys (2009), who used data on tax incentives and 
macroeconomic data from 40 Latin American, Caribbean and African countries, 
corporate tax rates and tax incentives, particularly tax holidays, positively affect the 
inflows of FDI in developing countries. However, research cannot suggest strong 
interrelation between tax incentives and economic growth. 
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2. Another study by Emmanuel Cleeve (2008) who examined the effectiveness of fiscal 
incentives in 16 Sub-Saharan African countries during the period 1990 to 2000 comes 
to the conclusion that despite the efforts of these countries to attract FDI through the 
implementation of tax incentives regimes, there has been noticed little success in 
relation to the “expected results” and high costs from the lost revenues. The study 
suggests that factors as government policies, location and the state of local 
infrastructure cannot be counterbalanced by any type of tax incentives (Cleeve, 2008). 
3. In their study,  Zee et al. (2002), after reviewing existing empirical literature in both 
developed and developing on the use of FDI tax policies and incentives and their cost-
effectiveness and impact in capital inflows, stress out that even when the 
implementation of tax incentives to attract FDI can be justified by the economic 
circumstances in a country, their cost effectiveness and impact on FDI cannot be 
granted as there are more important  conditions that must be met like legal and 
economic ones.  
What empirical evidence has shown about tax incentives is not absolute or clear (Zee 
et al., 2002). There are many controversial views based on contradictory data and 
empirical history. Until today we cannot suggest with certainty that they do or do not 
have a significant impact in the attraction of FDI as there are numerous other variables 
that have to be taken under consideration in every single case (Zee et al., 2002). 
Nevertheless, the only truth we can conclude in is that even if a tax incentive is 
considered quite attractive and appealing for foreign investment, it certainly cannot by 
itself compensate for a general weak and inefficient investment environment. Only a 
consistent political environment which positively affects macroeconomic stability and 
imposes efficient laws and obligations can create investment opportunities and attract 
foreign capital. This assumption is confirmed by the numbers of empirical studies 
which show that in developing and transition countries, despite the objectives and 
substance of the incentives offered, investors are reluctant to invest taking under 
consideration factors as political instability and stability in the macroeconomic 
environment (Beyer, 2002).  In line with the above assumptions, the Investment 
Climate Advisory, using marginal effective tax rate (METR) as a measure of 
effectiveness of tax incentives, ascertained that the “power” a tax incentive has in 
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order to attract FDI depends primarily on the general investment climate of the 
country. The weaker the investment climate is, the less efficient and effective the 
incentive. 
Tax incentives, when proved efficient for the attraction of FDI, enhance economic 
activity and development as well as produce positive long-term externalities. First of 
all, economic productivity creates new job opportunities and helps with a country’s 
levels of unemployment (Clark, 2000). Secondly, usually, when a multinational 
enterprise establishes in the host country, it operates at a “higher level” concerning 
gained profits, human resources and technologic level. This means that host country 
eventually gains higher revenues from the taxation of corporate income, new and well-
paying job opportunities and high-tech education (Easson, 2004).  What is more, many 
MNEs operate in Research and Development projects in order to embrace 
technological innovation. The produced technological innovation is quickly transferred 
to the local enterprises too and subsequently stipulate their productivity and 
competitiveness in the market (Klemm, 2010). Not only are the economies of scale 
improving, but the life quality too as financial prosperity strongly affects other sectors 
of a country’s reality like education, social infrastructures and facilities, personal well-
being etc.  
On the other hand, FDI tax incentives that are insufficient and inappropriate for their 
purpose can have quite damaging results for a country. Firstly, they are responsible for 
the distortion between new-entry enterprises and old ones as they lead to the 
misallocation of advantages that sometimes are granted to non-sustainable 
investments which mere fulfill the law’ s prerequisites (Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). In 
addition, the implementation of a special incentive framework for FDI erodes the tax 
base, creates uncertainty and interferes with the transparency that should 
characterize every legal instrument (Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). Moreover, while tax 
incentives mean profits for the investor, they also mean revenue costs for the state. 
These costs come from the several reductions, allowances and cuts that otherwise 
would not have been granted and also from the hypothesis that some investments 
would have been made even without the incentives (Zee et al., 2002). Finally, we 
cannot omit to mention the common technique of some enterprises to use very 
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generous tax incentive regimes abusively (rent-seeking activities etc.) and then change 
country or re-operate in a new legal form. Also, as tax incentives are often granted 
after the examination of the criteria needed by an administrative agency or 
committee, it has been noticed that incidents of bribery and corruption are very 
possible to appear (Reiter and Steemsma, 2010). In general, when governments adopt 
tax incentives which lack efficiency, (either legal, for example ambiguous legal 
provision, or practical, i.e. bad implementation in practice), all market imperfections 
are stressed out and eventually FDI declines (Reiter and Steemsma, 2010). 
After all the above been said, we conclude that, theoretically, tax incentives for the 
attraction of FDI are capable of fulfilling their purpose and provide significant positive 
results to the general framework  of a state as extra foreign capital can play the role of  
an important boost  to the macroeconomic development and market growth. 
However, in practice, after many attempts of different countries (either developed, 
developing or in transition) to implement this kind of incentives in order to attract FDI, 
reality has shown that tax incentives are a quite risky measure which when in a legal 
and social-economic environment with weaknesses and flaws, is responsible for the 
emerge of serious negative externalities as the distortion of the tax system, resources 
misallocation, uncertainty and revenue costs (Beyer, 2002). This is why recent 
literature discourages states to adopt tax incentives and proposes measures as general 
reform of the tax system, legal transparency and a stable regulatory framework.  
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The case of Greece 
If we make a brief historical recursion about FDI inflows in Greece, we will observe that 
until 1960, FDI was very limited due to the country’ s internal policy (Tsouka, 2017). 
During that period, the country focused on the recovery and development of its own 
industries and enterprises after world war 2 as well as the civil war afterwards 
(Tosounidis, 2016; Tsouka, 2017). It was 1960 when Greece turned its interest to FDI 
and started implementing some incentives concerning tax or import and export duties 
(Tosounidis, 2016; Tsouka, 2017). The agreement for the entrance of Greece in EEA in 
1961 constituted a nodal point for Greece’s opening to foreign investments and capital 
(Tsouka, 2017). Another benchmark for FDI inflows was the entrance of the country to 
the Eurozone in 1999, a decision that significantly increased foreign investments due 
to  the free movement of capital as an EU member, the reduction of the insecurities 
regarding the fluctuations of the foreign exchange rate and also the host of the 
Olympic Games which attracted foreign investors (Kolotouras, 2014). Today, a few 
years after the global financial crisis in 2009 which massively changed the economic 
situation and the FDI allocation both in the country but also at an international level, 
Greece tries to recover financially and evolve, gaining its seat among the other 
developed countries in the international financial competition (Lenakou, 2014).  
Therefore, its present policy focuses on the attraction of investment capital, both 
domestic and foreign which is believed to positively influence, directly and indirectly 
economic and social growth (Konstantinidis and Vlachou, 2018). Tax incentives, 
promotional institutions and governmental grants are some of the instruments the 
Greek State uses to accomplish its targets (Tsouka, 2017). Unfortunately, if we conduct 
a brief analysis of the legal framework, we can observe the fragmentation of the Law, 
meaning the existence of multiple legal regimes concerning investments and the 
difficulty for someone to detect what the real incentives are and under what 
conditions they are granted. In fact, the problem of complicated and fragmented legal 
framework in Greece is chronic and more general. This phenomenon is reflected to a 
recent survey conducted by the European Investment Bank (EIB, 2017), which 
highlights business regulations and taxation as well as uncertainty about the future to 
the most deterrent factors for corporate investment in Greece (OECD working paper 
for Greece, 2018). Moreover, according to the Global Competitiveness Report 2017-
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2018 (Schwab, 2018), tax regulations and high tax rates are some of the main obstacles 
for doing business. Now, regarding the incentives Tax Law provides for FDI, there is not 
a relative regime directed only to foreign investments using the foreign element as a 
prerequisite (Mantokoudi, 2017). However, for many legal regimes, attracting FDI 
constitutes one of their main targets, noted to their preamble and there are numerous 
provisions that even though they do not use the foreign element as a prerequisite, 
they are indirectly targeting to FDI (Mantokoudi, 2017; Tosounidis, 2016). This is why, 
it is noted that it is legitimate to look for the incentives, fiscal or not that Greece 
provides for strategic investments, a distinct category of investments that are 
expected to bring big positive results to the economy and that imprint an effort on 
behalf of the country to attract FDI (Gemenetzi et al., 2018).    
According to the Greek Law, in order for an investment to be characterized as 
strategic, it has to meet a few specific quantitative and qualitative criteria and 
generate the expected (according to the Law) results (Gemenetzi et al., 2018). The 
reason behind strategic investments’ special treatment is the strong belief that they 
are able to play the main role in the awakening of Greek economy and general 
development of the state. It is obvious that under the domestic circumstances Greece, 
just like most of countries that have experienced an economic crisis so deeply in their 
core, is primarily seeking the capital required from abroad, especially foreign direct 
investment that makes tangible impact in the inside of the country (Konstantinidis and 
Vlachou, 2018; Kottaridi and Giakoulas, 2013). This is why the measures and 
incentives, even their prerequisites could be considered indirectly directed to foreign 
investors, leaving domestic ones side-lined (Kottaridi and Giakoulas, 2013). Thus, this is 
a wide accepted accusation Greek government has faced through the years after the 
financial crisis.  
The last published Law regarding Strategic Investments is Law 4608/2019 with its 
amendment Law 4635/2019. Nevertheless, before continuing with our analysis it has 
to be mentioned that once again political changes and the new Greek government are 
about to change the present regime regarding foreign investments in their effort to 
make Greece traction pole for FDI.  
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The strategic investments incentives regime in Greece:  
The Greek State, since 2010, a few years after its exit from a strict fiscal control, has 
tried to update its international status by giving priority to the creation of a truly 
appealing destination for domestic and foreign investments (Konstantinidis and 
Vlachou, 2018). Following this direction, it is considered necessary for investments 
with significant qualitative and quantitative standards to play their role in all financial 
sectors in order to boost the country’s developing dynamic (Barkas and Pisu, 2018). 
After nine years since the first law concerning strategic investments (Law 3894/2010), 
the new legal regime is an effort for the modernization and the adjustment in the new 
post crisis era (Kottaridi and Giakoulas, 2013). Alongside, it provides a large scale of 
advantages and incentives for investors in order to attract them and in long term get 
benefited by them (Konstantinidous and Vlachou, 2018). 
To begin, one of the new and significant advantages is the fast track procedure that is 
provided to strategic investments (Gemenetzi et al., 2018). It gives the advantage of a 
speed process in the publication of licenses and other special administration 
documents investments need to start operating. More specifically, according to the 
fast track law, all the required licenses a new investment has to obtain in order to start 
operating have to be published by the appropriate authorities in the binding time 
period of 45 days (Palla, 2011). If the public authorities do not comply with the legal 
deadline, sanctions will follow (Palla, 2011). The Fast Track procedure seeks to create a 
safety zone for strategic investors as a speed up tool, promoting transparency through 
fast and clear processes (Gardiakou, 2018; Palla, 2011). Exclusive and binding 
deadlines in combination with the avoidance of unnecessary bureaucracy are expected 
to facilitate the establishment and operation of newly founded enterprises 
(Papadopoulos, 2017; Gardiakou, 2018). The incentive has been given to strategic 
investments as it is considered of great importance the licensing prioritization of 
investments that are about to play a central role in the national economy (Gardiakou, 
2018).  
Enterprise Greece, an official agency of the Greek State that operates as one stop shop 
for the aforementioned Fast Track procedure. This means that the strategic investors 
address to the organization in order for it to proceed to the required steps for the 
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publication of all the necessary licenses (Enterprise Greece Official Website, 2020). 
Moreover, Enterprise Greece promotes investments and contributes to the outward 
looking orientation of the Greek economy (Enterprise Greece Official Website, 2020). 
The promotion of Greece as an investment destination abroad is being achieved by the 
organization of various events and missions in collaboration, usually, with Greek 
embassies all over the world and always with governmental support (Enterprise 
Greece Official Website, 2020). Enterprise Greece is responsible to communicate to 
the potential investors all the necessary and basic information about the investment 
opportunities Greece provides, the current legal, administrative and tax framework 
and every other key information concerning their investment business plan (Enterprise 
Greece Official Website, 2020).  
The Law for Strategic Investments also adopts tax incentives that put strategic 
investors in a more favourable position than the ones who do not fall under the Law. It 
is obvious that the implementation of these incentives is an effort to repair the 
previous problematic sector of tax regime which constituted a serious obstacle for 
investors through the years (Gemenetzi et al., 2018). The tax incentives provided are:  
Stable tax rate incentive: This incentive is one of the most frequently used incentives 
for investments in Greece and it serves the same purpose with the stabilization clause 
in international treaties (Gardiakou, 2018). The law ensures the stabilization of the tax 
rate at the value it has on the time of the application of the investment in the strategic 
investments framework for a 12 year period of time (Nomos Official Website, 2020; 
Gemenetzi et al., 2018).  
Another tax incentive this law provides is tax holiday for the corporate income tax for 
the maximum period of 15 years, allowing investments to faster overcome their initial 
capital losses (Axioti, 2018). Moreover, the law provides the incentive of accelerated 
depreciation which focuses on a similar/identical outcome as well (Nomos Official 
Website, 2020; Gemenetzi et al., 2018). Namely, the incentive itself allows the investor 
to show a 100% higher depreciation so as to have tax benefits according to the income 
tax law (Nomos Official Website, 2020; Gemenetzi et al., 2018). The eligible costs 
concerning the above incentives are determined by the terms and conditions EU Law 
provides (Nomos Official Website, 2020; Gemenetzi et al., 2018).  
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In addition to fiscal incentives, Greece has enacted financial incentives with the form 
of governmental subsidies (Mantokoudi, 2017). More specifically, state aid is provided 
in two cases. The first is about covering or partially covering the cost for the 
recruitment of special categories employees (i.e. employees with disabilities or chronic 
conditions), while the second case has to do with subsidies concerning research and 
development projects (Gardiakou, 2018; Mantokoudi, 2017). The sum of the grants 
can be considerably high and according to the current Law they can also have the form 
of a lump sum, creating a very attractive prospective for potential strategic investors 
while, simultaneously, encouraging them to focus on acts and sectors the Greek state 
wants/needs (Papadopoulos, 2017).   
In addition to the special incentives for Strategic Investments as legal entities, the Law 
grants for special measures for the executives as well. Regarding the executives of an 
investment, in case of having their tax residence abroad, they are favoured by the 
preferential treatment the Law provides concerning their taxation in Greece for as long 
as their business relationship with the strategic investment exists (Gemenetzi et al., 
2018). Practically, it is considered that they maintain their foreign tax residence and 
they are taxed only for the income coming from their business in Greece. What is 
more, the above incentive is given also to the executive’s spouse or partner and to its 
children. Moreover, the Law is more lenient regarding of residents of third countries 
that desire to invest in a strategic project, allowing up to 3 investors to come and stay 
in the country and extra 10 persons in order to assist in the establishment and 
operation of the investment (Nomos Official Website, 2020). In addition, the Law 
specifically orders that every dispute arising between the strategic investor and the 
State is going to be resolved with arbitration procedures under UNCITRAL arbitration 
rules. Ending the reference of the incentives, we could not omit the special 
expropriation provisions under which expropriation is allowed for the operation of 
strategic investments, always after administration’s justified decision and full 
compensation (Nomos Official Website, 2020; Gemenetzi et al., 2018).  
One of the innovations of the Law of 2019 is the obligation between the State and the 
investor to sign a partnership memorandum which is going to cite their legal 
commitments and terms which have to be followed on both sides. These terms usually 
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include the completion of the investment along with its terms and especially the 
timelines of the licensing procedure, the project itself, the grant of compensation, the 
responsibilities of each party, the financial structure and the proof of financial ability 
for the completion of the investment (Nomos Official Website, 2020). To continue, for 
the first time, according to the Greek Law, there are special legal instruments for the 
supervision of the investment’s implementation in order to avoid unnecessary delays 
and divergences from the original plan. In addition to the supervision and if the 
strategic investor does not proceed with its investment according to its obligation, the 
law imposes serious sanctions like the declassification of the investment as strategic, 
heavy fines and retrospective cancelation of the tax incentives (Nomos Official 
Website, 2020; Gemenetzi et al., 2018). 
After the examination of all the above incentives it may be concluded that Greece 
gives all the motives needed in order for a foreign investor to initiate a project in the 
country (Gardiakou, 2018). It is a regime that offers incentives of serious importance 
but also imposes control mechanisms, sanctions and arbitration in case of disputes.  
Despite that, the truth is that none of the investment incentives written in the Law is 
capable of bringing the desirable results unless it is effective in practice (Natsi, 2015). 
This is why the effectiveness of the incentives should be examined by its legal 
perspective (Palla, 2011). Is the incentive applied in practice? Are the investors well 
informed? Are the necessary procedures simple and fast in order to get benefited? 
Although the quantity and the quality of the incentives seem ideal, why is Greece one 
of the EU countries with the lowest numbers of FDI? Are these measures enough and 
appropriate? Are they effective? Below, we are going to examine the effectiveness of 
the legal regime concerning Strategic investments, under the legal perspective of the 
term.   
Criticism on the effectiveness of the old regime  
The first legal regime concerning strategic investments was presented in 2010. Until 
now, only 15 of these investments have managed to enter into the fast track 
procedure after being characterized Strategic but after that, none of them has been 
implemented (Natsi, 2015). This phenomenon represents the weakness of the system 
to control and accelerate the operation of the business plan, providing the licenses 
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required following the fast track procedure but then letting the investor slow down or 
even stop its project. Thus, we cannot claim effectiveness in practice as the reality 
shows the opposite. What is more, since the strategic investments have not been 
completed, the other incentives, fiscal or not, cannot be examined since they have not 
been provided yet (Gardiakou, 2018).  
A distinct example of the flaws of the strategic investments policies through the years 
is the “Ellounda Hills” project, a luxury integrated resort development project in Crete 
by the international company Mirum Group (Enterprise Greece Official Website, 2020; 
Mirum Group Official Website, 2020). The Ellounda Hills project managed to be 
characterized as strategic in 2016 and entered in the fast track procedure but until 
today, due to the bureaucracy the constructions have not begun (Enterprise Greece 
Official Website, 2020; Mirum Group Official Website, 2020). All the other 14 projects 
are in similar stages. The defaults of the old system to attract both foreign and 
domestic direct investments are visible in the 2018 OECD economic survey. According 
to the report, regarding the real investment, there is a drop by 60% since its pre-crisis 
peak and ranks Greece to the 112th position among 137 countries as regards FDI 
inwards (Lenakou, 2014). Moreover, the report indicates the need for more changes 
and improvements to the financial and investment climate and takes under positive 
consideration the new law of 2019 for strategic investment (Lenakou, 2014; Schwab, 
2018). What is more, according to the Global Competitiveness Report 2016 - 2017 of 
World Economic Forum, the country is in the 86th position among 138 countries 
(Schwab, 2018). All the above constitute strong indicators about the constant changes 
the Greek economy and financial policy has to proceed to. The law of strategic 
investments is a good start but there are much more to be done in order for the 
country to be transformed into an attractive place for FDIs. Greece has been judged 
many times for its unstable legal regime, bureaucracy, restrictive product market 
regulation, corruption etc (Papadopoulos, 2017; Reiter and Steemsma, 2010; Axioti, 
2018). The new law is capable, always under the assumption that it is followed as 
expected, to cure some of the country’s frauds and create a steady infrastructure that 
will help to attract and establish new investments (Paneta, 2019). It is important to 
gain foreign investors’ trust and form a fertile environment for new investments (Palla, 
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2011). On the other hand, we must not ignore that according to the literature and 
empirical studies, no investment law is capable of bring economic development on its 
own. There also must be prosperity and stability in the host country, things that 
Greece has failed to demonstrate so far (Mantokoudi, 2017). This means that Greece 
should also focus in reducing political distress which will give motives to both domestic 
and foreign investors (Mantokoudi, 2017). In December 2019, the government 
announced the approval of 6 Strategic investments for a total of 1.05 billion Euro that 
are about to take place in the country, mostly in the fields of tourism and renewable 
energy sources (Paneta, 2019). However, unless these investments come to life, it’s 
very difficult to claim legal effectiveness and success of the system.  
FDI, as mentioned before, is an ambiguous topic that has drawn the attention of 
scholars and politicians. The most popular opinion is that FDI is necessary for the 
economic development in the era of globalization, and the increase of the competition 
among firms which will benefit the consumer and the countries involved (Levitt, 1993). 
However, we must take into consideration the negative impact that FDI can have, 
especially when there is special treatment (incentives) by the government. Is the host 
country ready to accept new foreign investors without negatively impacting the 
domestic investors? Greek investors have passed one of the biggest economic crises 
are slowly recovering and ask from their government support in order to become 
competitive again (Axioti, 2018). On the other hand, the government is convinced that 
FDI is a very efficient and effective way for the country’s economy to recover (Axioti, 
2018). Furthermore, there are cases where governments are willing to sacrifice the 
country’s natural environment and resources in order to attract strategic FDI. Gold and 
coal mining as well as big hotels are some examples of the aforementioned cases. 
Under such circumstances, it is debatable on whether the FDI contributed in a better 
economy or a lower quality of life.  Lastly, we must not forget that Greece is one of the 
countries with the highest tax rates and, simultaneously the most unsteady political 
and regulatory environment (Axioti, 2018). 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper, we attempted to give answers to some questions regarding tax 
incentives as means for the attraction of foreign direct investment (FDI) and then 
made a short reference about and comparison with the reality in Greece concerning 
direct investment and more specifically strategic direct investment.  
To begin, the new economic era, with the emerge of global markets and transnational 
trade, has formed a new reality where private financial sector and relevant institutions 
are now the main drivers for the formation of politics and the creation of new 
economic principles, rules and customs. The development and expansion of 
multinational companies has resulted in powers and influence like never before in the 
history. Therefore, it is broadly accepted that the increase of FDI in an economy can be 
proved beneficial for the country. On the other hand, as we examined above, today, 
this opinion has several valid arguments. The collapse of local enterprises and the 
uneven competition terms, as well as the possible infringement of labor rights are 
some of the possible negative effects from the inflow of FDI. Based on our analysis, we 
conclude that the strong presence of foreign direct investment in a country is able to 
contribute to its financial and broad development. The inflow of extra foreign capital 
and the boost of the local business sectors can significantly promote better economic 
conditions and welfare in the country. On the other hand, we remain skeptical about 
the increased FDI levels when in weak economies. In this case, it is of keen importance 
for the government and policymakers to have a clear and well-informed perception of 
the financial conditions and investment climate of the country. What is more, 
politicians should have as main concern the general prosperity of the country and not 
their financial and other kind of personal interests. Otherwise, unnecessary FDI will be 
proved harmful and result in all the negative externalities mentioned above. 
Modern countries, as well as developed and developing, influenced by the widely 
accepted thought that foreign direct investment (usually in the form of MNCs) leads to 
financial growth, choose their course of action and compete each other in an 
international level for the attraction of FDI. While the determinants and conditions a 
foreign investor desires are not predetermined, governments choose to use standard 
means for their aims as the signing of international investment agreements (IIAs) and 
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the implementation of fiscal, financial and other types of incentives (Blonigen, 2005). 
Among all of them, fiscal (tax) incentives are the ones that we dealt with as nowadays 
they constitute a typical method for the increase of FDI and a tool for international tax 
competition. International governmental practice has formed some “typical” tax 
incentives like tax holidays and accelerated depreciations, means that are also familiar 
to the Greek legal framework. The examination of FDI of tax incentives leads us to the 
following conclusions: 
1. Regarding the implementation of special FDI tax incentives; the country’s 
administration has the obligation to ensure for the right and lawful application of the 
means. More specifically, the incentive must be provided only to the qualified - 
according - to - the law investors and under the specific terms and conditions 
mentioned to the law. In our opinion, this is a very challenging task for many reasons. 
First of all, special mechanisms and procedures have to be established for the 
incentives’ application and supervision which will at first operate in an experimental 
way causing financial and political costs for the country. Secondly, in host countries 
where there are incidences of corruption and non-transparency, the prospective 
foreign investors will be negatively biased and will not trust an administration 
characterized as unsound and corrupted (Reiter and Steemsma, 2010). Moreover, in 
fragile and unstable legal frameworks, the implementation of one or more special legal 
regimes by administration will likely cause more uncertainty and mistrust towards 
administration’s decisions and acts.  
2. Regarding the impact FDI tax incentives have to foreign direct investment’s inflows; 
according to the literature review, the assumption that tax incentives by definition 
increase FDI levels, cannot be verified. We referred to different empirical studies and 
findings which make us support the opinion that special FDI tax incentives do not 
necessary correlate with increased foreign direct investment. We support that the 
provision of special tax incentives to foreign investors by the host country may boost 
their interest about expanding or establishing for the first time their investment into 
its territory. However, the same result can also be generated by the provision of other 
kind of incentives such as special governmental grants or the provision of faster and 
simpler administrative procedures. This is why empirical studies can only indicate the 
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correlation between FDI and tax incentives. The most important determinants for 
foreign investors are the political and economic stability of the country, always in 
combination with investment’s special operations and plans (Blonigen, 2005). Good 
investment climate, fair and stable laws as well as sound financial management are the 
factors foreign investors mostly look for. In contrast, when the host country lacks these 
determinants, none of the tax incentives it may provide can counterbalance its basic 
weaknesses.  When a country’s aim is to attract more FDI, it is highly recommended to 
start by giving priority to its core institutions and services first. Enactment of lawful 
and straightforward legal provisions, easier and faster administrative procedures, 
special care for the general tax regime with amendments and ameliorations are 
considered more appropriate and effective means. What is more, infrastructure 
improvements and general business stimulation through projects, financial support 
and training can create a very fruitful and beneficial investment and a financial 
environment where any investor would desire to operate. 
3. Regarding the enactment of special FDI incentives and their impact on a country’s 
economic growth and general welfare; as mentioned above, under the ideal 
circumstances, in a country characterized by its strong economy and its financial, social 
and environmental levels, FDI tax incentives can have positive implications. Under the 
optimal economic conditions, the concept of special incentives for each category of 
investment, (domestic or foreign) seems highly efficient. However, perfect economies 
do not exist neither do perfect markets with perfect legal systems. For start, countries’ 
tax regimes are not flawless. Usually they cause imbalances and confusion to 
taxpayers. Thus, the implementation of additional special tax incentives to foreign 
investors is likely to contribute to the enlargement of problems such as legal instability 
and uncertainty. What is more, special tax incentives to foreign investors will create a 
significantly more favorable status quo, downgrading local investors and their 
businesses. In general, after having analyzed multiple possible dangers and risks 
regarding the adaption of FDI tax incentives, our opinion is that they should be avoided 
by the governments. This is because their scope and significance are too important to 
be ignored. One of our main concerns among others is the possibility that 
governments, especially the ones with capital shortage, in their efforts to attract 
33 
 
foreign investment, many times exaggerate with the incentives. The too-friendly, too-
open to FDI climates often cause collateral damages. These damages are related to 
country’s revenue costs, domestic businesses’ losses etc. But most importantly, the 
policy of constant imposition of tax incentives leaves no room for the amelioration and 
reconstruction of the tax system at its core, ignoring and multiplying current legal 
problems and imbalances. A healthy and stable tax system is a main prerequisite for 
the economic development and welfare, as well as for the attraction and maintenance 
of foreign direct investment, as we noted above to this study.  So, countries should 
focus on the general revision of their tax system and financial policies and reconstruct 
a healthier economy with essential advantages for investors, both local and foreign.     
Concerning the part of our study referring to Greece we can safely say that the Greek 
economy never was one of the most powerful economies globally or even in EU.  The 
country has a weak the investment sector, both local and foreign. One the other hand, 
we talk about a country that has very recently experienced a big economic crisis and 
still presents elements of development (Kottaridi and Giakoulas, 2013). In our opinion, 
Greek policies should turn into investments in order for financial positive results to 
come. First of all, since the local investment sector in its majority consists of small and 
medium size businesses, which are the backbone of the Greek economy, governmental 
aid should be given to them. Policymakers should not forget to encourage the small 
local investors in their effort to attract foreign and in most cases considerably bigger 
investors. The law should primarily encourage domestic entrepreneurship (especially 
in sectors where Greece has an advantage, as tourism and agriculture) and strengthen 
new established operations. In this way, the financial development will begin to 
accelerate, and its first signs will start to show by the raise of new investments and the 
increase of taxable profits. Moreover, Greece through regulations, amendments and 
restructure must create a friendly investment climate for FDI too. As we saw earlier in 
this paper, the FDI’s positive results do not appear in the same way and with the same 
intensity to every national economy. However, the inflow of foreign investment is 
capable to boost economy and financial competition as well as general welfare under 
certain circumstances. The law for strategic investments reveals the efforts of the 
country to attract them but, in practice, the results are less than mediocre. We 
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strongly believe that there cannot be any special development law that is capable of 
bringing all the desired results by itself. The strategic policy for the attraction of FDI 
can be a long standing and time-consuming process. In order for Greece to invert its 
former non appealing investment climate to an attractive one, it requires constant 
attention and refining. Undoubtedly, the main concerns of the country should be the 
macroeconomic stability of Greek economy as well as the legal and political stability. 
Then, Greece will have all the resources needed for the creation of a comprehensive 
national strategic plan, targeted to FDI but also to the designation of a whole new 
investment policy that will eliminate problems, enrichened entrepreneurship levels, 
and promote the investment opportunities to foreign investment world. Finally, as 
regards to the taxation, if Greece desires to boost investments, the government should 
decrease the tax rates in general and ensure the stability of the applied law. However, 
this does not mean that it should not take under consideration the special features and 
needs that a category of investments may have. New and old investments, foreign and 
local, in order to develop their operations should have the certainty and security of a 
stable tax system which promotes competitiveness and efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
References 
 
Agiomirgianakis, G. M., Asteriou, D., & Papathoma, K. (2003). The determinants of 
foreign direct investment: A panel data study for the OECD countries. 
Axioti, E. M. (2018). Άμεςεσ Ξζνεσ Επενδφςεισ και Επιχειρθματικότθτα: Παράγοντεσ 
που επθρεάηουν τισ ειςροζσ Άμεςων Ξζνων Επενδφςεων ςτθν Ελλάδα, επιςκόπθςθ 
και μελλοντικζσ προοπτικζσ [Foreign Direct Investment and Entrepreneurship: Factors 
that affect the FDI inflow in Greece, a review and prospects]. 
Barkas, P., & Pisu, M. (2018). Boosting investment in Greece. 
Beyer, J. (2002). “Please invest in our country”—how successful were the tax 
incentives for foreign investment in transition countries?. Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, 35(2), 191-211. 
Bjorvatn, K., & Eckel, C. (2006). Policy competition for foreign direct investment 
between asymmetric countries. European Economic Review, 50(7), 1891-1907. 
Blonigen, B. A. (2005). A review of the empirical literature on FDI 
determinants. Atlantic economic journal, 33(4), 383-403. 
Clark, W. S. (2000). Tax incentives for foreign direct investment: empirical evidence on 
effects and alternative policy options. Canadian Tax Journal, 48(4), 1139-1180. 
Cleeve, E. (2008). How effective are fiscal incentives to attract FDI to Sub-Saharan 
Africa?. The Journal of Developing Areas, 135-153. 
Davies, K. (2012). Inward FDI in China and its policy context in 2012. Transnational 
Corporations Review, 4(4), 4-18. 
De Mooij, R. A., & Ederveen, S. (2003). Taxation and foreign direct investment: a 
synthesis of empirical research. International tax and public finance, 10(6), 673-693. 
Demirhan, E., & Masca, M. (2008). Determinants of foreign direct investment flows to 
developing countries: a cross-sectional analysis. Prague economic papers, 4(4), 356-
369. 
36 
 
Easson, A. J. (2004). Tax incentives for foreign direct investment. Kluwer Law 
International BV. 
Enterprisegreece.gov.gr. (2020). Αρχική - Enterprise Greece - Προςζλκυςη - Προώθηςη 
Επενδφςεων & Προώθηςη Εξαγωγών. [ Home – Enterprise Greece -Attraction – 
Promotion of investments and promotion of exports] [online] Available at: 
https://www.enterprisegreece.gov.gr/ [Last Accessed 30 Jan. 2020]. 
Gardiakou, G. (2018). Επιχειρθματικι πολιτικι και ςτρατθγικι ςτθν Ελλάδα ςτα 
πλαίςια τθσ παρατεταμζνθσ κρίςθσ [Business policies and Strategies in Greece during 
the crisis]. 
Gemenetzi, G., Papagora, D., & Angelidou, T. (2018). Applying the Fast Track Law for 
Strategic Investments: how fast and for whom?. RELAND: International Journal of Real 
Estate & Land Planning, 1, 116-123. 
Gergely, J. (2003). Trends in foreign direct investment incentives. European 
Communities Studies Association Working Paper, 5. 
Ginevičius, R., & Šimelytė, A. (2011). Government incentives directed towards foreign 
direct investment: a case of Central and Eastern Europe. Journal of Business Economics 
and Management, 12(3), 435-450. 
Hanson, G. H. (2001). Should countries promote foreign direct investment? (Vol. 9). UN. 
Holland, D., & Vann, R. J. (1998). Income tax incentives for investment. Tax law design 
and drafting, 2, 2-9. 
IMF, O., & UN, W. (2018). Options for Low Income Countries’ Effective and Efficient 
Use of Tax Incentives for Investment. 
James, S. (2009). Tax and non-tax incentives and investments: evidence and policy 
implications. FIAS, The World Bank Group. 
James, S. (2009). Incentives and investments: evidence and policy implications. World 
Bank. 
Jensen, N. M., & Malesky, E. J. (2010). FDI incentives pay–politically. 
37 
 
Jirasavetakul, L. B. F., & Rahman, J. (2018). Foreign Direct Investment in New Member 
State of the EU and Western Balkans: Taking Stock and Assessing Prospects. 
International Monetary Fund. 
Klemm, A. (2010). Causes, benefits, and risks of business tax incentives. International 
Tax and Public Finance, 17(3), 315-336. 
Klemm, A., & Van Parys, S. (2012). Empirical evidence on the effects of tax 
incentives. International Tax and Public Finance, 19(3), 393-423. 
Kolotouras, V. (2014). Πολιτική και διπλωματία για τη προςζλκυςη άμεςων ξζνων 
επενδφςεων: η περίπτωςη τησ Ελλάδασ (Master's thesis, Πανεπιςτιμιο Πειραιώσ) 
[Policies and Diplomacy for the attraction of Foreign Direct Investment: the case of 
Greece (Master’s Thesis, University of Piraeus)]. 
Konstantinidis, C., & Vlachou, A. (2018). Appropriating Nature in Crisis-ridden Greece: 
Deepening Neoliberal Capitalism, Part 2. Capitalism Nature Socialism, 29(2), 108-121. 
Kottaridi, K. & Giakoulas, D. (2013). Άμεςεσ Ξζνεσ Επενδφςεισ ςτθν Ελλάδα: Οι 
Επιπτώςεισ τθσ Κρίςθσ και ο Ρόλοσ των Θεςμών [Foreign Direct Investments in Greece: 
The outcomes of the crisis and the role of the institutions]. Athens: Greek Institution of 
European Politics 
Lenakou, A. (2014). Άμεςεσ ξζνεσ επενδφςεισ-μζκοδοι προςζλκυςθσ ςε κράτθ τα 
οποία ανζρχονται από τθν οικονομικι κρίςθ [Foreign Direct Investments-Incentives to 
countries which are recovering the economic crisis]. 
Lent, G. E. (1967). Tax incentives for investment in developing countries. Staff 
Papers, 14(2), 249-323. 
Levitt, T. (1993). The globalization of markets. Readings in international business: a 
decision approach, 249. 
Lim, D. (1983). Fiscal incentives and direct foreign investment in less developed 
countries. The Journal of Development Studies, 19(2), 207-212. 
38 
 
Mantokoudi, I.(2017). Η φορολογικι νομοκεςία ςτθν διάρκεια τθσ κρίςθσ ςτθν Ελλάδα 
από το 2010 ζωσ ςιμερα: θ επίδραςθ ςτα φορολογικά ζςοδα [The Tax Law during the 
crisis in Greece from 2010 until today: the impact on taxable income]. 
Morisset, J., & Pirnia, N. (1999). How tax policy and incentives affect foreign direct 
investment: a review. The World Bank. 
Natsi, E. (2015). Άμεςεσ ξζνεσ επενδφςεισ ςτην Ελλάδα-βαςικοί τομείσ επζκταςησ-
προοπτικζσ και εμπόδια (Master's thesis, Πανεπιςτιμιο Πειραιώσ) [Foreign Direct 
Investments in Greece-main areas for development and obstacles (Master’s thesis, 
University of Piraeus)]. 
Nilsen, K. R. H. (2013). The Concept of Tax Sparing: A general analysis, and an analysis 
and discussion of the various features of tax sparing provisions (Master's thesis). 
Nomos.gr. (2020). Law Firm – Nomos. [online] Available at: https://www.nomos.gr/en/ 
[Last Accessed 30 Jan. 2020]. 
OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs,. (1998). Tax Sparing: A Reconsideration. 
Oecd.org. (2020). OECD.org - OECD. [online] Available at: https://www.oecd.org/ [Last 
Accessed 30 Jan. 2020]. 
Palla, O. E. (2011). Το ελληνικό θεςμικό πλαίςιο προςταςίασ και προώθηςησ των 
ξζνων άμεςων επενδφςεων [The Greek institutional initiatives to protect and promote 
foreign direct investments] (No. GRI-2012-7931). Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. 
Paneta, E. (2019). Διακλαδικι ανάλυςθ άμεςων ξζνων επενδφςεων ςτθν Ελλάδα 
[Intedisciplinary review of Foreign Direct Investments in Greece]. 
Papadopoulos, P. (2017). Η Πορεία των Άμεςων Ξζνων Επενδφςεων ςτθν Ελλάδα: 
Εμπειρικι ζρευνα για τθν επίδραςθ των ειςερχόμενων Άμεςων Ξζνων Επενδφςεων 
ςτο Ακακάριςτο Εγχώριο Προιόν τθσ Ελλάδασ [Foreign Direct Investment in Greece: an 
empirical research for the impact of FDI in the GDP of Greece]. 
Porcano, T. M., & Price, C. E. (1996). The effects of government tax and nontax 
incentives on foreign direct investment. Multinational Business Review, 4(1), 9. 
39 
 
Reiter, S. L., & Steensma, H. K. (2010). Human development and foreign direct 
investment in developing countries: the influence of FDI policy and corruption. World 
development, 38(12), 1678-1691. 
Rolfe, R. J., Ricks, D. A., Pointer, M. M., & McCarthy, M. (1993). Determinants of FDI 
incentive preferences of MNEs. Journal of International Business Studies, 24(2), 335-
355. 
Schwab, K. (2018, December). The global competitiveness report 2018. In World 
Economic Forum (pp. 9-14). 
Šimelytė, A. (2013). The characteristics of foreign direct investment intensification 
policy. 
Tan, Z. A. (2002). Product cycle theory and telecommunications industry—foreign 
direct investment, government policy, and indigenous manufacturing in 
China. Telecommunications Policy, 26(1-2), 17-30. 
Tollison, R. D. (2004). Rent seeking. In The Encyclopedia of Public Choice (pp. 820-824). 
Springer, Boston, MA. 
Tosounidis, K. (2016). Άμεςεσ ξζνεσ επενδφςεισ ςτθν Ελλάδα: αναςκόπθςθ και 
προοπτικζσ [Foreign Direct Investments in Greece: a review and prospects]. 
Tsouka, E. (2017). Οι Άμεςεσ Ξζνεσ Επενδφςεισ ςτθν Ελλάδα 2001-2016 [Foreign Direct 
Investments in Greece 2001-2016]. 
Zebregs, M. H., & Tseng, M. W. (2002). Foreign direct investment in China: some 
lessons for other countries (No. 2-3). International Monetary Fund. 
Zee, H. H., Stotsky, J. G., & Ley, E. (2002). Tax incentives for business investment: a 
primer for policy makers in developing countries. World development, 30(9), 1497-
1516. 
Zones, S. E. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World 
Investment Report (WIR). 
 
